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Baseline	 136	 no	 no ‐‐ ‐‐	 ‐‐
Reward	 40	 no	 yes ‐‐ yes	 no
Shock	 29	 yes	 yes yes no	 no
No	Reputation	 38	 yes	 yes yes yes	 no


































































































	 Reward Risk Risk	/Reward	 Reputation
Amount	Sharedt–1	 0.09	(0.06) 0.14	(0.12) 0.07	(0.06) 0.03	(0.07)
Group	Activityt	 1.15***	(0.39) ‐0.31	(0.25) ‐0.25	(0.36) ‐0.22	(0.52)
Shockedt	 	 108.24*** (24.53) 82.18** (32.99)	 ‐40.70	(42.69)
Shockedt	X	Amount	Sharedt–1	 	 ‐0.14	(0.19) ‐0.19	(0.13) 1.16**	(0.55)
Shockedt	X	Group	Activityt	 	 2.48	(1.51) 2.28** (1.14) 5.66***	(1.73)
Periodt	 ‐0.92	(1.43) ‐1.18	(1.76) ‐2.78** (1.16) ‐2.30	(1.87)
Constant	 72.71***	(22.64) 45.60** (22.27) 72.87*** (16.62)	 73.13**	(33.38)
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16	
cooperation	in	both	the	Risk/Reward	and	Reputation	treatments.	Although	results	indicate	sharing	1 
with	those	experiencing	the	shock	is	conditioned	on	the	individual’s	allocation	to	the	group	activity	2 
(Table	2),	the	levels	of	sharing	are	insufficient	to	induce	an	increase	in	cooperation.	If	a	person	3 
receives	a	shock	in	the	Reputation	Treatment,	the	return	from	an	hour	allocated	to	the	group	4 
activity	was	9.66	rubles	(5.66	as	reward	for	an	allocation	via	sharing	plus	4	from	the	group	5 
activity),	which	is	still	lower	than	the	per	hour	return	of	10	rubles	from	the	individual	activity.		6 
	7 
	 	8 
17	
Table	3.	Individual	Allocation	to	Group	Activity	(Stage	2	only,	rounds	6‐13)	1 
	 Model	1	 Model	2	
Reward	Treatment	 omitted	 omitted	
Risk	Treatment	 ‐1.642	(1.76)	 ‐1.849	(1.60)	
Risk/Reward	Treatment	 ‐0.961	(1.74)	 ‐0.947	(1.77)	
Reputation	Treatment	 0.380	(2.86)	 0.642	(2.54)	
Round	 ‐0.095	(0.16)	 ‐0.095	(0.16)	
Baseline	Group	Activity	 0.775***	(0.10) 0.754***	(0.11)	
Gender	1	 	 ‐1.525	(1.52)	
Age	 	 0.099**	(0.04)	
Race	1	 	 ‐0.206	(2.07)	
Community	1	 	 ‐3.427**	(1.42)
Community	2	 	 ‐1.595	(1.73)	
Community	3	 	 omitted	
Constant	 3.616	(2.70)	 2.375	(2.93)	
N	 1088	 1072	
Robust	standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	group‐level.	Baseline	Group	Activity	is	the	mean	of	the	2 
individual’s	decisions	in	the	Stage	1	Baseline	treatment	(rounds	1‐5).	Dependent	variable	is	the	3 
individual	allocation	to	the	group	activity.	Statistical	significance:	***:	p<0.01;	**:	p<0.05	4 
	 Thus,	we	find	some	support	for	Panchanathan	&	Boyd’s	(43)	model	of	indirect	reciprocity.	5 
Individuals	in	need	do	receive	substantial	support,	and,	when	possible,	this	support	is	conditioned	6 
on	their	reputations	for	cooperation.	However,	the	benefits	from	a	positive	reputation	did	not	7 
exceed	the	costs	of	participating	in	the	group	activity,	and	as	a	result,	the	ability	to	share	did	not	8 
increase	cooperation.	9 
18	
Discussion	1 
We	systematically	examined	the	interactions	of	strategic	and	environmental	risks	among	people	in	2 
Kamchatka	who	face	these	challenges	repeatedly	in	the	post‐Soviet	era	(47).	Introducing	3 
idiosyncratic	environmental	risk	in	the	social	dilemma	increased	interdependence,	and	people	4 
responded	by	channeling	resources	to	those	in	need,	rewarding	individuals	for	cooperation,	and	5 
punishing	individuals	who	did	not	cooperate.	The	ability	to	share	as	a	tool	to	mitigate	6 
environmental	risk	increased	the	interdependence	among	group	members.	As	a	result,	high	levels	7 
of	sharing	were	achieved	without	direct	reciprocity	or	a	strong	commitment	device.	Observed	8 
sharing	is,	however,	consistent	with	local	sharing	norms.	We	find	strong	evidence	for	sharing,	even	9 
without	reputations,	which	is	consistent	with	a	model	of	pro‐social	behavior	(and	related	10 
experimental	results)	in	which	preferences	for	keeping	social	rules	are	the	driving	force	behind	11 
pro‐social	behavior	(48).	12 
When	current	or	past	behavior	was	observable,	sharing	was	conditioned	on	observed	13 
cooperative	behavior.	In	the	Reward	Treatment,	individuals	who	participated	more	in	the	group	14 
activity	received	more	from	sharing,	consistent	with	previous	studies	that	emphasize	the	15 
importance	of	rewards,	punishments,	and	reputations	for	the	emergence	of	cooperation	(42,	49).	16 
The	positive	relationship	identified	between	sharing	and	allocations	to	the	public	good	in	the	17 
Risk/Reward	and	Reputation	Treatments	suggests	that	when	both	strategic	and	environmental	18 
risks	are	present	in	a	social	dilemma,	the	effects	of	strategic	risks	depend	on	environmental	risks.	19 
These	results	have	important	implications	for	research	on	risk‐pooling,	the	role	of	reputations,	20 
rewards,	and	punishments	in	theories	of	cooperation,	and	more	generally,	the	role	of	21 
environmental	variability	in	human	adaptation	and	resilience.	22 
	 Ethnographic	research	on	risk‐pooling	emphasizes	the	importance	of	supporting	those	in	23 
need	and	mechanisms	of	reputation	to	maintain	cooperation	(25,	50).	Lab	experiments	inspired	by	24 
19	
this	research	have	demonstrated	that	high‐variance	resources	and	reputations	can	play	a	key	role	1 
in	the	emergence	of	risk‐pooling,	dramatically	increasing	reciprocal	exchanges	among	individuals	2 
relative	to	low‐variance	resources	(51)	and	that	risk‐pooling	strategies	can	increase	individual	and	3 
pair‐wise	survival	in	environments	with	high	degrees	of	risk	(52).	Similarly,	agent‐based	4 
simulations	have	shown	increased	environmental	harshness—which	can	be	mitigated	via	5 
cooperation—can	amplify	cooperation	(53).	Each	of	these	studies	emphasizes	the	impact	of	6 
interdependence	on	the	emergence	of	cooperation.	We	contribute	to	this	work	by	demonstrating	7 
how	asymmetries	of	need	caused	by	stochastic	environmental	risks	or	“shocks”	interact	with	the	8 
strategic	risks	tied	to	rewards,	punishments,	and	reputations	to	increase	interdependence	and	9 
enhance	risk‐pooling.	In	both	the	Risk/Reward	and	Reputation	Treatments,	individuals	who	10 
contribute	more	to	the	public	good	receive	more	via	sharing,	but	only	when	they	suffer	a	shock.	11 
These	interactions	between	strategic	and	environmental	risks	suggest	strategic	risks	remain	12 
important	for	precisely	those	individuals	who	benefit	most	from	risk‐pooling,	discouraging	13 
defectors	and	free‐riders.	Indeed,	we	found	the	effectiveness	of	risk‐pooling	increased	when	people	14 
had	the	ability	to	monitor	and	act	upon	reputations	across	multiple	rounds.	While	previous	15 
research	has	emphasized	the	importance	of	exogenous	commitment	devices,	formal	institutions,	16 
endogenous	group‐formation,	and	direct	reciprocity	for	effective	risk‐pooling,	our	experiments	17 
show	that	risk‐pooling	can	emerge	from	endogenous	reputation	dynamics	and	indirect	reciprocity.			18 
Although	the	interaction	of	strategic	and	environmental	risk	enhanced	the	effectiveness	of	19 
risk‐pooling,	we	did	not	observe	systematic	increases	in	the	group	activity	reported	by	previous	20 
studies	where	rewards	are	offered	in	the	context	of	a	social	dilemma	(5,	39,	42).	One	explanation	is	21 
that	the	benefits	of	good	reputations	for	cooperators	never	exceed	the	costs	of	contributing	to	the	22 
public	good.	Previous	studies	with	a	similar	two‐dilemma	design	amplify	the	impact	of	reputations	23 
by	increasing	the	relative	costs	and	benefits	(i.e.	efficiency)	of	rewards	and/or	punishments,	often	24 
with	ratios	as	high	as	1:3	(4–7,	54).	Thus,	increasing	levels	of	cooperation	observed	in	previous	25 
20	
experiments	may	not	be	due	to	the	presence	or	absence	of	rewards	and	punishments	per	se,	but	the	1 
presence	of	highly	efficient	rewards	and	punishments	(55–57).	While	highly	efficient	2 
reward/punishment	mechanisms	have	been	shown	to	increase	levels	of	cooperation	in	3 
experiments,	it	is	less	clear	how	often	such	mechanisms	are	available	in	naturally	occurring	4 
contexts	of	cooperation	(58).	Indeed,	the	way	participants	condition	aid	to	needy	players	based	on	5 
cooperation	reflects	local	norms	of	indirect	punishment,	which	are	more	commonly	observed	in	our	6 
study	region	than	norms	of	direct,	individual	costly	punishment.			7 
	 In	addition	to	addressing	individual	strategic	behavior,	our	study	highlights	the	important	8 
role	of	factors	that	increase	interdependence	among	individuals.	We	investigated	one	factor—9 
stochastic	resource	acquisition—that	increases	interdependence	by	creating	consumption	deficits	10 
that	can	be	overcome	by	pooling	resources	through	sharing.	Such	deficits	might	also	arise	from	11 
differences	in	individual/household	productive	capacity	and	consumptive	needs	(59)	or	stochastic	12 
differences	in	harvests	due	to	poor	health	or	other	misfortunes	(60,	61).	Our	experiments	13 
incorporate	consumption	deficits	via	stochastic	shocks,	providing	a	specific	factor	for	amplifying	14 
the	impact	of	reputations	relative	to	the	highly	efficient	reward	and	punishment	mechanisms	15 
utilized	in	previous	studies.		16 
	 Scholars	studying	processes	of	contemporary	human	adaptation	to	unprecedented	forces	of	17 
global	climatic,	economic,	political,	and	cultural	change	have	emphasized	the	crucial	role	of	18 
strategies	that	mitigate	environmental	risks	(62).	Many	components	of	contemporary	adaptation—19 
including	the	role	of	traditional	ecological	knowledge,	social	networks,	institutions,	and	other	forms	20 
of	social	capital—depend	on	cooperation	among	individuals	to	maintain	resilience	in	the	face	of	21 
shocks	and	perturbations	(63).	Therefore,	understanding	how	environmental	risks	interact	with	22 
strategic	risks	to	affect	the	emergence	and	stability	of	cooperation	can	improve	our	attempts	to	23 
adapt	to	the	challenges	we	face	in	contemporary	environments.	Our	research	suggests	theories	of	24 
21	
cooperation	can	contribute	to	this	goal	by	investigating	a	broader	range	of	factors	that	increase	1 
interdependence.	2 
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